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Abstract 
With the cyber advancing rapidly, huge scale cyber trusted service and privacy protection has been more and more 
important. The paper presents the cloud-based service method for user identity attribute service in cyberspace, and 
the method based on the service model of multilevel cyber identity management provides user identity attribute 
service for cyber applications, and implements the mechanism of multilevel privacy protection policy, and presents 
the authentication service of the eID certificate and the coherence authentication service of the eID identity. As a 
result, security of web applications along with user privacy is protected by providing fine-grained access control with 
user identity attribute and strong authentication services. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
With our national E-Business and E-Government moving deeply in cyberspace, the trust and privacy 
have been more and more focused on. Some applications request authenticating the user identity in the 
real world, and most applications only confirm some user attributes to decide whether giving specific 
services. 
Currently, most of the web applications adopt the registration of the user name and the password, E-
mail, or the phone number, so that it concludes difficult to confirm the identity and easy to steal and abuse 
the identity. And the traditional PKI-based application, by issuing the certificate with the real identity 
information and storing it in the security cryptographic token, can resolve the identity stealing and abusing, 
but it also discloses the real identity information for many applications. Thus, it leads to the security threat 
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of user privacy. So it is necessary to research the new cyber user identity attribute service method, 
including the multilevel privacy protection, providing fine-grained access control with user identity 
attribute, and protecting user privacy under assuring cyber application security, and so on. 
2. Related Research 
The bases of identity attribute services are identity management models, which mainly include: 
Service-Centric IDM, No-Service-Centric FIM, and User-Centric IDM, etc.  
Privilege-Centric IDM mainly bases privilege on the application, also called Service-Centric IDM [1].
According to the identity request of applications and applied domain, the IDM center restricts the 
integrality and authenticity of user individual information, etc. So the user can only choose to provide the 
application with the attribute or not. 
No-Service-Centric FIM [2] mainly aims to satisfy the identity union and resource share across domain. 
In the process of the federated identity management, one identity management provider can give the user 
attribute information to other federated members under the permission of user. The federated identity 
management (FIM) aims to enable a group of service providers to recognize user identifiers and 
entitlements from other service providers within a federated domain. Dedicated languages and web 
services based management protocols are developed for the exchange of identity information. Standards 
like the Liberty Alliance specifications, the Web Services Federation Language (WS-Federation) and the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) provide methods which allow an SP to retrieve 
information about a user from the user’s IDP. [3-4]
Entrusted IDM aims at the user center, also called User-Centric IDM. In the process of the IDM, users 
join completely and prescribe the privacy policy to decide the user information of the Service Provider 
attained. User-centric identity management proposed a general approach for making users better able to 
control and manage their digital identities. The EC-funded project PRIME (Privacy and Identity 
Management for Europe) adopts anonymous credentials with various extensions and policy languages to 
implement privacy-aware access control. Trusted infrastructures that enable the establishment of trust 
relationships across multiple identifier domains in the context of identity management are implemented by 
using the trusted computing architecture. However, IDP has to participate in the authentication process 
between users and SPs which may cause a decrease in performance and usability. [5-8] 
The cloud [9] is where we go to use technology when we need it, for as long as we need it, and not a 
minute more. We do not install anything on our desktop, and we do not pay for the technology when we 
are not using it. The cloud can be both software and infrastructure. It can be an application we access 
through the Web or a server that we provision exactly when we need it. It can define three criteria in 
discussions on whether a particular service is a cloud service: The service is accessible via a web browser 
(nonproprietary) or web services API; Zero capital expenditure is necessary to get started; We pay only 
for what we use as we use it. 
3. Cloud-based Trusted Identity Attribute Service 
Because of the information security contradiction of the user’s real identity between business 
application system and users, and the huge quantity of users, cloud-based trusted identity attribute service 
model will separate user’s real identity management from the business account management, entrust 
official management departments to maintain the real identity service separately and manage the real 
identity in the official management domain. And it can provide the cloud-based trusted support of user’s 
real identity for the virtual business account. For the virtual business account, it can give the universal 
service interface to all kinds of applications with the appropriate account management service. 
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Fig. 1. (a) cloud-based trusted identity service architecture; (b) trusted identity attribute service framework 
As shown in Figure 1 (a), the general cloud-based trusted identity attribute service architecture mainly 
includes the identity authentication and attribute service interface, enterprise authentication node, single-
sign-on, personal authentication node, privilege management node, and the service data platform. The 
identity authentication and attribute service interface is in charge of the user’s cloud-based identity service, 
including enterprise, website and personal users. And the cloud-based service is realized by the enterprise 
authentication node and the personal authentication node. And the service data platform as the trusted 
party manages the user’s real identity information and provides the identity service data for the enterprise 
authentication node and the personal authentication node through the service interface to provide the 
business applications with all kinds of identity management service. 
As shown in Figure 1 (b), the identity authentication service based on the digital identity management 
platform and eID (electronic identity) mainly include authentication service, real-name registration service 
with the application, attribute service, and information issuing service, etc. 
The user registers on the digital identity platform by the public security department, and gets the digital 
identity eID binding with the real identity. And the digital identity uses as the token of authentication and 
application identity management, and according to the user’s privacy policy, providing the privilege for 
the application attribute request. 
The online applications such as E-Business and cyber amusement require registering in the digital 
identity platform and attaining the corresponding enterprise identity so as to finish united authentication, 
identity management, and information booking, etc. concerning the digital identity platform. 
4. Mechanism of Multilevel Privacy Protection 
The mechanism of multilevel privacy protection creates the user privacy policy formulation and policy 
fusion mechanism to realize the administrable and controllable function of the user attribute privacy 
information issuing, as shown in Figure 2 (a). 
                    
Fig. 2. (a) the mechanism of multilevel privacy protection; (b) the user controllable attribute assertion (rapid mode) 
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The user’s virtual business account binding with the real identity can provide the account in the 
application system with trusted token. But for assuring user privacy security, the business account 
management system can’t see the real identity information in the process of the identity binding. And for 
many cyber business applications, it requires the real identity information joining. So we can provide user 
attribute information for the application by attribute issuing process to assure the business application 
system to operate regular. 
After the identity binding, the real identity service provider should assess the business type and the 
deploying security environment, and according to the formulated XACML attribute privacy policy, 
deciding to issue the attributes, attribute information proving, and provides the retrieval and issuing 
service of the user’s identity information for the business account service level by the cyber business 
application requirement. And the forbidden issuing attribute information can’t be seen by the account 
service level to realize the user attribute privacy protection. Also, attribute privacy policy should be 
constructed by assessing the account service level requirement and the deploying security environment 
and by the trusted party as the real identity administrator, thus, it can forbid the application system by 
cheating way to get the extra user attribute information and to use other way, which may lead to leakage 
of user privacy. 
The user attribute assertion policy includes system policy and user prescribed policy. The SP includes 
all kinds of attributes, the application ways (AW), and the assertion methods (AM) which will issue to all 
application systems and users.  
In addition to all kinds of attributes, the application ways, and the assertion methods will issue to a 
specific application system or user. The UP allows users to specify attribute rules (AR) for different 
application system. We can note that only UP permits users to choose the attribute assertion to operate. 
The user’s administrable and controllable attribute assertion can assure digital identity management 
platform only to provide attribute assertion results for the user’s privilege application system. And the 
application service provider requests some user attribute information after it finishes the mutual 
authentication with users and gets the user privilege and gives the attribute assertion to the digital identity 
platform. Safe attribute assertion assures application server not to fake the user privilege and also not to 
use the user privilege limitlessly, so as to assure the user privacy privilege. 
On the other hand, for promoting the efficiency of the attribute assertion, forbidding the application 
service to get the attribute assertion every time from the eID information service platform, and lessening 
the pressure of the eID information service platform, system can choose some attribute information stored 
into the eID digital identity according to system policy and eID digital identity capacity, as shown in 
Figure 2 (b). 
5. The Authentication Service of the eID Certificate 
The stages of the authentication service of the eID certificate: 
The client sends its service requests to the service provider with the eID certificate and signature 
information in a Web Service Security [2] (or WSS, for short) SOAP header. The eID certificate is 
encapsulated in the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element, while the signature information is 
encapsulated in the <wsse11:SignatureConfirmation> element. 
The service provider does not check the certificate and signature itself. It realizes security 
authentication by passing the eID certificate and signature information to the eID certificate authentication 
service based on the digital identity management platform. 
The eID certificate authentication service verifies the eID certificate and signature information. If the 
owner of the eID certificate has predefined user attribute assertion policies, the eID certificate 
authentication service finds out the system policies and user prescribed policies related to the eID 
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certificate and the service provider and determines the degree and granularity of user identity and 
attributes that could be presented to the service provider. 
The eID certificate authentication service returns the authentication results to the service provider. The 
service provider then determines whether the service requests are allowed to be performed. 
6. The Coherence Authentication Service of the eID Identity 
The coherence authentication service of the eID identity is shown as follows: 
The client obtains the eID Subject CN by extracting the common name (Subject CN) from the eID 
certificate's subject DN. Then it sends the eID Subject CN and the name, identification number and type 
which has been presented during real identity registration process in a WSS SOAP header. The name and 
identification number is encapsulated in the <xenc:EncryptedData> element for privacy protection. 
The eID identity compliance verification service calculates the hash value of the received name, 
identification number and type through SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm. The hash value is compared 
with the binary data of the Subject CN. 
The eID identity compliance verification service returns whether the name, identification number and 
type are the real identity corresponding to the Subject CN according the comparison result. 
7. Conclusion 
The paper presented the new cloud-based trusted identity service method, and the method based on the 
service model of multilevel cyber identity management provided user identity attribute service for cyber 
applications, and implemented the multilevel privacy protection mechanism, and presented the 
authentication service of the eID certificate and the coherence authentication service of the eID identity. 
And the system had been primary implemented and achieved good effects in actual applications. 
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